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TAX AVOIDANCE
Alan Gunn*

Tax reduction is not evil !fyou do not do it evilly.
Murphy Logging Co. v. United States 1
Away from here-that is my destination.
Franz Kafka2

This Article attempts an almost purely negative criticism. I contend that efforts to explain the results of tax cases not involving penalties by reference to "tax avoidance" are never satisfactory,3
whether the reference is meant to describe a taxpayer's state of mind
or to justify a tax rule by invoking some "need to prevent tax avoidance." Because many tax problems are commonly discussed in
terms of "tax avoidance" in one of these senses, and in order to
avoid the impression that my arguments would leave the tax law in
shambles, I shall suggest some alternative ways of dealing with these
problems. But the positive aspects of the argument are intended
only to illustrate that alternatives to "tax-avoidance" thinking are
available, not to catalogue all of these alternatives, for that task
would be unending.
Before dealing with the merits of "tax-avoidance" approaches to
problems, it may be useful to consider, by way of an example, some
different uses of the term "tax avoidance." Suppose that the city of
Metropolis imposes a wage tax on the earnings of those who work or
reside there. Does this tax apply to someone who works outside the
city but rents an apartment in the city to be close to city attractions?
• Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.S. 1961, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1970, Cornell University.-Ed.
I. 378 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1967).
2. IJer At!l!Jroch, in SXMTLICHE ERZAHLUNGEN 321 (P. Raabe ed. 1970).
3. My thesis as stated may be somewhat misleading. By "result" I mean only the answer
to the question whether certain conduct should incur certain tax consequences. I do not mean
to suggest that considerations of tax avoidance have absolutely no place in tax law. I consider
it highly desirable, for instance, that those who draft general tax rules anticipate, and accommodate their rules to, possible tax-motivated responses. See text at note 111 iefra.
By no means are tax laws uniquely subject to avoidance attempts; much of my discussion
about taxation may have parallels in other fields. See generally Browder, Giving or Leaving-What Is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 845 (1977), which discusses cases invalidating inter
vivos transfers not satisfying the formalities required for wills because the donor was trying to
avoid leaving the property in question by will. Many other examples of "avoidance" of nontax laws are described in Note, Fraud on the Law-The IJoctrine ef Evasion, 42 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1015 (1942).
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Whenever required to give his address, the taxpayer uses that of his
parents, who live outside Metropolis in a house where he rents a
room, stores many of his possessions, and spends most weekends.
What can people mean when they attempt to justify their opinion
that the taxpayer should be subject to the city wage tax by referring
to ''tax avoidance"? They may mean that he must pay the tax because he maintains his suburban connections with the intent of
avoiding that tax. Were this approach adopted by the taxing authorities, a taxpayer who behaved similarly but with a different motive would not be subject to the tax. Thus, one who maintained a
suburban residence in order to vote against a loathsome suburban
congressman or to use the suburban community swimming pool
would not be taxed. If, however, the reason for imposing the wage
tax on "residents" is that fairness requires those who benefit from
city services to pay for them, this distinction is not very appealing. I
doubt whether anyone would even raise the "tax-avoidance purpose" argument in extreme cases. For instance, if the taxpayer
moved away from the city permanently because he disliked the tax,
few would argue that his motive justifies continued liability.4
Other people might make a "tax-avoidance" argument in support
of taxing the earnings of our renter by asserting that a rule taxing
such people "is needed to prevent tax avoidance." This argument
need not refer to motive, since the person advancing it might well
accept a rule taxing everyone who maintains an apartment in the city
whatever his motives for claiming a residence elsewhere.
Those are the important uses of "tax avoidance," but other possibilities exist. For example, one might conclude, after analyzing
the law of Metropolis, that the taxpayer who rented an apartment
was clearly subject to the wage tax and was "avoiding" the tax by not
paying it. Tax professionals call this "tax evasion." The distinction
between "avoidance" and "evasion" is quite clear in principle,
though not always in fact: one "evades" taxes by avoiding payment
without avoiding liability, while one who avoids liability "avoids"
the tax. "Tax avoidance" might also be used as shorthand for the
suggestion that the law should be changed so that som~ho do not
now pay a tax must in the future. Accordingly, some say that those
who live on the interest from tax-exempt bonds5 are "avoiding
taxes." This is simply an unpleasant and imprecise way of proposing that section 103 be repealed.
4. Bui cf. I.R.C. § 877 (a United States citizen who renounces citizenship to avoid taxes
remains subject to tax on income from United States sources).
5. I.R.C. § 103.
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Part I of this Article will examine cases that deny benefits to taxpayers on the ground that they entered into the transactions in question principally to reduce taxes. I shall discuss the extent to which
this practice exists under a variety of guises and show that its principal drawback is not the practical problem of proving motive, as is
sometimes supposed, but its inconsistency with customary ways of
resolving tax cases. I shall then illustrate alternative means of dealing with "tax-avoidance" schemes and provide examples of unsatisfactory case and statute law resulting from "tax-motive" solutions.
Part II will show that arguments characterizing certain rules of tax
law as "needed to prevent tax avoidance" assert nothing more than
that those rules are good rules. Using recent Supreme Court "assignment of income" cases as examples, I demonstrate that failure to
appreciate this point produces unsatisfactory analysis. I argue that,
although there is no reason why tax-motivated taxpayers should be
treated differently from taxpayers with nontax motives, intelligent
formulation of judicial and legislative rules requires that tax-motivated behavior be anticipated.

I.

TAX-AVOIDANCE PURPOSE

A.

The Problem

If the frequency with which a proposition appears in judicial
opinions reliably measured its accuracy, nothing in the tax law
would be more certain than the principle that the tax consequences
of a transaction do not depend upon whether the transaction was
undertaken to avoid taxes. 6 The Supreme Court's affirmance of that
principle dates back at least to 1873, when it noted that a taxpayer
had ''the legal right" to avoid a tax on checks of twenty dollars or
more by issuing two ten-dollar checks to a creditor.7 In Gregory v.
6. I except from this statement statutes that contain a tax-avoidance-purpose test, th,ough
one may suspect that the test actually used in applying those statutes involves something other
than taxpayer purpose. Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation ofPrivate Law lo the Law of Taxation, 31 TuL. L. REV. 355, 391 (1963), points out that determinations under I.R.C. § 367(a)(l) (simply§ 367 when Fuller wrote), which appears to require a
purpose test, are made by the National Office, which "has no facilities for pursuing an inquiry
into the subjective purposes of the taxpayer."
7. United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873). The statute in question in
Isham imposed a stamp duty upon bank checks, drafts, and other specified instruments.
Isham, the superintendent of a ·mining company, had issued unstamped scrip drawn on the
company's treasurer to pay employees. Thus, the taxpayer had issued an instrument fulfilling
the function of those instruments which were required to have stamps but which differed in
form. The Court held that a taxpayer has the right to use "devices to avoid the payment of
duties" if the method chosen is "not illegal." 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 506. In dictum, the Court
hypothesized that a taxpayer would have "the legal right" to avoid a tax on checks of twenty
dollars or more by issuing two ten-dollar checks to his creditor. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 506.
The Isham Court's reliance on appearances to distinguish between taxable and nontaxable
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He!vering, the leading "anti-tax-avoidance" case, the Court said,
"The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of whatever
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits, cannot be doubted." 8 Learned Hand's dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Newman most forcefully states
the doctrine:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty
to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not
voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is
mere cant.9

Is tax-avoidance purpose, which the courts have held "over and
over again" to be irrelevant, even worth discussing? The answer is
certainly ''yes," if only because some have managed not to notice.
The Carter Commission Report, 10 for example, devotes a forty-two
page appendix to "Problems of Tax Avoidance," nearly all of which
concerns techniques for detecting taxpayers who enter into transactions to reduce taxes. Although the report discusses the American
cases, including Gregory v. Helvering, with apparent approval, it
skirts the question whether a tax-avoidance motive should even be
relevant by flatly asserting that "motive would seem to be an essential element of tax avoidance" and that a taxpayer "who adopts one
of several possible courses because that one will save him the most
tax must be distinguished from the taxpayer who adopts the same
course for business or personal reasons." 11
transactions, though perhaps still acceptable in sales taxation, reflects an outmoded philosophy
concerning income taxation. Rudick, The Problem ofPersonal Income Tax Avoidance, 1 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 246 (1940).
8. 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). According to the Court, the issue was "whether what was
done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended." 293 U.S. at 469.
Judge Hand's opinion for the court of appeals said, "We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, ifwe chose, to evade, taxation." Helvering
v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), qffd., 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
For a more recent statement, see Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960) ("We
put aside a finding by the District Court that (the taxpayer's] 'only motive ... was to attempt
to secure an interest deduction' " (footnote omitted)). More illustrations can easily be found.
Most of the early cases rejecting tax-avoidance motive as a ground for determining tax liability
are discussed in R. Paul, Restatement of the Law of Tax Avoidance, in STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 9 (1st ser. 1937).
9. 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 8S9
(1947). Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J.
440, 4S6 (1968), calls this passage "undoubtedly the most eloquent short defense ever to appear
of the state of being tax-conscious and, by implication, of the art of tax planning."
10. 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION: TAXATION OF INCOME (CA·
NADA) 537-78 (1966).
11. Id. at S38 (emphasis added).
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Those aware of the courts' repeated assertions sometimes suggest
that the courts are not being candid. One writer describes statements like Learned Hand's as "pious protestation[s]" which "simply
cannot be the law under any circumstances." 12 Another calls the
maxim that people are free to reduce their taxes a "bromide," 13 and
a third calls it "perfectly true, perfectly general, and perfectly meaningless." 14
Cases can certainly be found which give good reason to believe,
or which explicitly state, that the taxpayer lost because his principal
purpose for engaging in a transaction was tax reduction. In Brooke
v. United States, the Ninth Circuit said that "a transfer solely to
avoid taxes will not be recognized." 15 More often the opinions imply, without expressly admitting, that the court has been influenced
by the presence or absence of a tax-avoidance purpose. In Irvine K.
Furman, for instance, the Tax Court observed that the legal right to
reduce one's taxes "is not dogma." 16 Sometimes a description of a
transaction as a "sham," accompanied by mention of a tax-avoidance motive, suggests that "sham" means nothing more to the writer
than "a transaction entered into to reduce tax liability," 17 Under
12. Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. R.E.v. 1021, 1038
(1953).
13. Bittker, What Is "Business Purpose" in Reorganizations?, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 134, 137 (1950). Specifically, Professor
Bittker argues that conditioning favorable taxation upon the existence of a nontax reason for
the relevant transaction "does not undermine the bromide that a taxpayer is free to arrange his
affairs so as to reduce his tax liability; it means only that the Treasury doesn't have to help him
along." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). But if the absence of any purpose other than tax avoidance does influence tax consequences, the taxpayer is not truly free to minimize his tax liability, unless we read the Court as adopting a sporting approach under which tax avoidance may
be attempted but may not succeed if found out. The language in Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465,469 (1935) ("apart from the tax motive") and Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361,
365 (1960) ("We put aside a finding . . . that [the taxpayer's) 'only motive . . . was to attempt
to secure an interest deduction' ") can only mean that the Court considers the taxpayer's purpose a neutral fact in determining tax liability.
14. R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 164 n.57 (rev. ed. 1945). Magill is surely right if he
means that the maxim does not tell us how cases should be decided, but it is at best misleading
to describe as ~•meaningless" a principle that tells us how not to decide cases. Avoiding error
surely furthers the pursuit of truth.
15. 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972). The court cited Gregory as support. With one
dissent, the court accepted the district court's findings of several nontax motives for the transaction in question and so affirmed the decision for the taxpayer.
16. 45 T.C. 360, 364 (1966), affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967). Furman held
that the trust in question should not be recognized for income tax purposes because of a "lack
of economic reality." 45 T.C. at 366. The grantor of a trust retained a reversionary interest
and denied the trustee any significant power. Indeed, the trustee (the grantor's wife) did nothing more "than passively acquiesce in [the grantor's) wishes." 45 T.C. at 364. The beneficiaries never acquired any beneficial interest, and none of the parties took the trust seriously
except when filing tax returns.
17. E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40, ruling that a temporary divorce obtained so that
spouses can file as single taxpayers "should not be given any effect for Federal income tax
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such an approach, a tax motive will be held against the taxpayer
whenever the decision maker is inspired to call the transaction a
"sham."
Cases applying-or misapplying-the "business purpose doctrine" of Gregory v. Helvering 18 also show the tendency of the courts
to hold a tax-avoidance motive against the taxpayer. Although the
Supreme Court denied that Mrs. Gregory's tax motive was a reason
for deciding the case against her, it described her transaction as "an
operation having no business or corporate purpose." 19 If the tax
success of a transaction depends on a business purpose, and if "business purpose" means what it seems to mean-a purpose other than
that of reducing taxes-the principle that tax-avoidance purpose
does not count against the taxpayer has been seriously undermined.
The principle that transactions will not be ignored because entered
into to reduce taxes means nothing if transactions entered into without a nontax reason will not be given effect.20 The business-purpose
purposes if it merely serves the purpose of tax avoidance." Bui cf. Rev. Rul. 78-285, 1978-31
I.R.B., which holds that tax-avoidance purpose is not sufficient to repudiate a transaction if a
significant event takes place.
18. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
19. 293 U.S. at 469. Although the Second Circuit also stated that it would not decide
against Mrs. Gregory because of her tax motive, it similarly described her transaction as being
"no part of the conduct of the business of either or both companies." Helvering v. Gregory,
69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934), qffd., 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
20. Some of the cases imply that, although a strong tax motive will not invalidate an otherwise tax-favored transaction, a transaction entered into "solely" for tax avoidance will not be
given effect. For example, in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960), the Supreme
Court concluded that the transaction, from which the taxpayer could have realized "nothing of
substance . . . beyond a tax deduction," was a "sham." One might suspect that the taxpayer
in fact lost his deduction because tax avoidance was the sole purpose of the transaction. However, "sham" and "real" transactions cannot sensibly be differentiated according to a purported distinction between transactions inspired "solely" by tax reduction and transactions
partially, but not exclusively, so inspired. Consider the facts of Knetsch. The taxpayer bought
single-premium annuity contracts, borrowing the purchase price from the seller and prepaying
interest. He then systematically borrowed the excess of the loan value of the contracts over his
indebtedness. The only possible nontax benefits to the taxpayer were (1) an increase in the
value of the contracts in the unlikely event of a precipitous fall in interest rates, see Blum,
Knetsch v. United Stales: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 150,
and (2) the trivial annuity payments scheduled to begin thirty years after the purchase.
One can reasonably assume that these nontax benefits played no part in Knetsch's decision
to buy the contracts. That does not mean, however, that Knetsch lacked a nontax purpose for
buying them. By investing in one kind of tax shelter, the taxpayer necessarily decides not to
invest in other tax shelters. Knetsch, for example, might have obtained tax benefits as impressive as those he hoped to get from his annuities by investing in an oil-drilling operation. Ifhe
considered such a venture but opted for less risky annuities, he had at least one nontax purpose
for his transaction: to protect himself against the potentially ruinous losses sometimes incurred
by oil investors. Every transaction necessarily involves foregoing other opportunities; thus, no
transactions are entered into "solely" to reduce taxes. The distinction between solely and
partially tax-motivated transactions is entirely imaginary and can be safely ignored.
That a transaction had no business purpose may occasionally be a useful finding, not because of a general rule that transactions without business purposes fail, but because the absence of a business purpose illuminates another important issue. For example, United States
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doctrine is sensible to the extent that it means, as it seems to have
meant in Gregory, that corporations must actually carry on business
activities to be recognized as corporations under the reorganization
provisions,21 though it might better be called the "business-effect"
doctrine. But to go further and say, as the regulations 22 and some
shareholders with over 50% voting power may enter any number of arrangements that shift
nominal voting power, but not actual control, to foreign shareholders, in order to avoid having
a foreign corporation in which they own these shares labelled a "controlled foreign corporation" under § 957. The agreement may be that the foreign shareholders will withhold their
votes or vote only as the United States shareholders dictate. Or United States shareholders
may create and place in the hands of foreign shareholders a class of stock with only nominal
voting power. Treas. Reg.§ l.957-l(b)(2) (1963) provides that the nominal voting power of
that class of stock will be ignored in determining whether United States shareholders own
more than 50% of the voting power of all classes of stock if three conditions are met. The
third condition requires that "a principal purpose of the arrangement is to avoid the classification of such foreign corporation as a controlled foreign corporation under section 957." This
"business purpose" requirement makes sense, since the absence of any good business reason
for creating a class of stock with nominal voting power suggests that the recipients of the stock
may be puppets of the United States shareholders. Again, however, tax avoidance, or the
absence of a business purpose, is relevant only as evidence. For more on the evidentiary use
of tax avoidance motive, see text at note 41 iefra.
21. Several courts and commentators have so interpreted the business purpose doctrine.
See R. MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 133 (1943) (corporations "should live their
lives, for a reasonable time at least, and should have something to do," to be cognizable under
the reorganization rules); Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61
YALE L.J. 14, 28 (1952) ("the Gregory case turned primarily on the permanence test"). See
generally w. Andrews, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS AND NOTES 826-28
(1969), which describes five possible interpretations of the Gregory opinion.
In Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (1st Cir. 1949), Chief Judge Magruder described the new corporation in Gregory as "an evanescent creature." He also rejected the
taxpayers' argument that in applying Gregorys "business purpose" test to the transaction in
question, a "corporate purpose" instead of a mere "shareholder purpose" is necessary.
In Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935),
Judge Learned Hand said that the incorporator's intent to avoid taxes in Gregory was "legally
neutral" and that their plan failed because they had not "really meant to conduct a business by
means of the two reorganized companies." But see Commissioner v. Transport Trading &
Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950), where
Judge Hand interpreted Gregory to mean that a tax provision pertinent to "commercial or
industrial transactions" should not apply to "transactions entered upon for no other motive but
to escape taxation." B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
739 (4th ed. 1972), notes the apparent inconsistency in these explanations of the significance of
tax-avoidance motive.
Cf. Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 677-78 (1st Cir. 1956), where the
court rejected the government's argument that certain sales should be ignored because they
transpired "between friends and for tax motives":
To strike down these sales . . . would only tend to promote duplicity and result in extensive litigation. . . . It is no answer to argue that, under Gregory v. Helvering, there is an
inescapable judicial duty to examine into the actuality of purported corporate reorganizations, for that was a special sort of transaction, whose bona fides could readily be ascertained by inquiring whether the ephemeral new corporation was in fact transacting
business, or whether there was in fact a continuance of the proprietary interests under an
altered corporate form.
22. E.g., Treas. Reg.§ l.368-l(b) (1960), providing that the reorganization provisions exempt from the general rule of recognition of gain or loss on exchanges of property only "such
readjustments of corporate structures .•. as are required by business exigencies." Treas.
Reg.§ 1.368-l(c) (1960) states that a transaction "the object and accomplishment of which is

740

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:733

cases23 do, that a transaction must be entered into for a business reason (or even a "corporate" as distinct from "shareholder" business
reason), 24 is to say that in those areas of the tax law to which the
business-purpose doctrine applies, 25 a strong tax motive is fatal to
the transaction despite the Supreme Court's assurance otherwise in
the case that created the doctrine.
The strained and unsatisfactory statutory interpretations used in
gift-and-leaseback cases to strike down tax-motivated transactions illustrate further the practical importance of tax-avoidance purpose in
deciding cases. In the typical gift-leaseback case, an owner of business property, often a doctor who owns his office building, gives the
property to a trust and specifies his dependents or other close relatives as beneficiaries. He then rents the building from the trust,
which he has carefully designed so that its income will not be taxed
to him under the granter trust provisions of the code. The doctor
plainly wants a section 162 business expense deduction for the rent
at the cost of the rent money, which remains in the family. 26
Many cases deny the section 162 deduction in the gift-leaseback
situation. Courts commonly hold that the rental payments were not,
as section 162 requires, "made as a condition to the continued use
. . . for purposes of the trade or business,"27 since the rental obligathe consummation of a preconceived plan having no business or corporate purpose, is not a
plan of reorganization."
23. E.g., Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C. 1012, 1026, ajf'd. per curiam, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir.
1958); J.D. & A.B. Spreckles Co., 41 B.T.A. 370, 374 (1940) (corporations whose acquisition
"does not serve a business purpose, as distinguished from a taic-reducing purpose" are not
affiliates under the consolidated-return regulations).
24. Compare Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 922 (1972) (corporate-business purpose required) with Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1962) ("personal or noncorporate-business interests of the
shareholders" sufficient).
25. Although the business-purpose doctrine originated in the corporate reorganization context, it has spread to several other areas. See Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 749
(1977) (dissenting opinion) ("since its genesis in the context of corporate reorganizations, the
doctrine of Gregory has enlisted such a following that an inquiry into whether the substance of
a transaction corresponds to its form is now appropriate in every area of taic law"); Summers, A
Critique of the Business-Purpose .Doctrine, 41 ORE. L. REV. 38, 43 (1961). The doctrine's tendency to wander into new fields has occasionally been checked. E.g., United States v. Davis,
397 U.S. 301,312 (1970), which held that the lower court was "wrong in looking for a business
purpose and considering it in deciding whether [a] redemption was equivalent to a dividend"
under§ 302(b)(l).
26. But see [1978] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ~ 1382.07, at 17,295, which says that
"financial and professional reasons" induce taicpayers to transfer business property to a trust
and lease it back, and notes almost in passing that "these transactions also bring with them
some tax advantages." The "financial and professional reasons" given (the possible interest
conflict inherent in a physician's ownership of both a medical practice and an adjoining pharmacy, and a professional's desire for working capital) are both absurd. Everyone knows that
gift-leaseback deals are heavily taic-inspired.
27. 1.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
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tion grew from a "personal" decision to transfer the property to the
trust. 28 In effect, those courts answer the question whether a rental
payment is a business expense by determining whether the transaction giving rise to the rental obligation was a business transaction,
rather than by determining whether the rental property was used for
a business purpose. According to this analysis a taxpayer who
signed a long-term lease intending to use the property for personal
purposes, but who later used it in a business, would be denied a
rental deduction. That result is patently unsatisfactory.
A few courts deny rental deductions in the gift-leaseback cases
where the taxpayer retains a reversionary interest in the trust on the
ground that he has an "equity"29 in the property within the meaning
of section 162(a)(3), which allows the deduction only if the taxpayer
"has no equity" in the property. But the Tax Court convincingly
rejected that interpretation of the "no equity" requirement in Mathews v. Commissioner.Jo Although the court found no useful legislative history, it concluded that according to common sense section
162(a)(3) should be read to disallow current deductions for a
"capitalizable item" but to allow a rental deduction when the rental
payments are not appropriate additions to basis.JI The statutory
28. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965); Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327, 329-30 (1975). Contra, Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948); Engel v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa.
1975); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 532 (1965). For the purpose of applying the businesspurpose test, the Tax Court at least distinguishes between gift-and-leaseback agreements
where the leaseback is "prearranged" (in that it is arranged at the inception of the trust and the
trustee may never exercise independent discretion whether to lease back to the granter) and
agreements where the trustee has such discretion even though the leaseback to the granter is
agreed upon at the trust's inception. Compare Butler v. Commissioner, supra (if the trustee
incurs the obligation to lease back to the granter as a condition of transfer, then the gift and
leaseback are a "single, integrated transaction" and no rental deduction is allowed unless a
business purpose exists for the initial transfer) with Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12
(1973), revd., 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976) (if trustee has
independent discretion whether to lease back to grantor, then only the leaseback, as distinguished from the initial gift transfer, must have a business purpose to qualify for a r,ental
deduction). Long before Butler and Mathews, Froehlich, C/tfford Trusts: Use of Partnership
Interests as Corpus; Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 956, 970 (1964), argued that
that distinction is artificial and of little practical importance since the granter has every incentive to be the highest bidder for the property even if the trustee can lease it to anyone.
29. E.g., Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Fla. 1969), affd. per curiam,
422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962)
(alternative holding).
30. 61 T.C. 12 (1973), revd. on other grounds, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976).
31. 61 T.C. at 23. Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks ofBusiness Property
in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21, 37-39 (1965), discusses and rejects the idea that only the
amount of the rent less the annual increase in the value of the grantor's reversionary interest
should be deductible, since only that amount is the real cost to the grantor.
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language could be read to mean just the opposite, for it requires that
the taxpayer "have" no equity, not that he not be acquiring one.
This rather technical reading can be easily refuted, however, by saying that the "property" the taxpayer rents is the present interest, not
the reversionary interest.32 The taxpayer has no equity in that. As
the Mathews opinion notes, it would be absurd to deny a rental deduction simply because the taxpayer owns some interest other than
the interest being rented in the building. Absent a clear tax-avoidance purpose, the courts would surely not deny the deduction, for
instance, to one co-tenant who rented the other's interest33 or to a
remainderman who rented the life tenant's interest. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the unconvincing analyses of
section 162(a) in many of the gift-leaseback cases is that the taxpayers' obvious tax motives were the real reason for the government's
victories. 34
32. 61 T.C. at 23.
33. 61 T.C. at 22-23. See Froehlich, supra note 28, at 976:
It is submitted that the view taken by the courts in the lease-option cases is the correct
interpretation of "equity" in section 162(a)(3). It is entirely reasonable to preclude deductibility of a payment which is not for the temporary "use" of property, but in reality is
adding to ownership equity. On the other hand, there is no justifiable reason for summarily preventing the rental of property by a person who happens to have an ownership
interest in the property other than his leasehold interest. Such a rule would preclude not
only the rental of property donated to a short term trust, and the rental of property subject
to an option to purchase, but other practical and honestly conceived business transactions.
For instance, is there any reason to prevent the lessor of a master supermarket lease from
being a subtenant of the lessee in the supermarket liquor department? Should a vested
remainderman be prevented from renting from the life tenant? Suppose a vendee desires
to take possession of premises prior to the close of escrow. Is there any policy justification for denying deductibility to the rental payments made for the short term business
lease arranged so as to allow early occupancy? The answer to all these questions must be
"no."
It is suggested, therefore, that the recent literal interpretation of "equity" made in the
referenced leaseback cases is not correct, and that it should be rejected.
34. The main substantive reason given by the courts for denying the rental deduction in
many of the leaseback cases is that the arrangement diverts some of the taxpayer's income.
E.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965). That is true, but not a persuasive reason for denying a deduction absent some important reason for distinguishing between an assignment by way of a trust of an income interest in
an office building leased to a stranger and a similar assignment of a similar interest in a building leased to the grantor. See Engel v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 5, 5-6 <y{.D. Pa. 1975):
[H]ad the trustee of the property conveyed by plaintiff to the Clifford trust rented out this
property to a third-party while the plaintiff rented similar premises on the open market for
the same rent, the tax consequences would be the same as the result here if the plaintifi's
deduction is upheld. Any reduction of the plaintiffs' taxes which resulted from this packaged business arrangement has been sanctioned by Congress in Sections 671-678 . . . .
The court may have overstated the case in its last sentence. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 365, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5006, states that I.R.C. §§ 671-79
have "no application in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a
trust under a transfer and leaseback arrangement." Since this history expressly leaves the
development of the gift-and-leaseback law to the courts, it is technically incorrect to say that
Congress has "sanctioned" this form of tax reduction. Nevertheless, the court's result and
reasoning are sound. Since there is no economic difference between the assignments of income permitted under the grantor trust provisions and those involved in a transfer and lease-
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The D!fficu!ties of Proving Motive

Many argue that tax-avoidance purpose should be irrelevant to
the determination of tax liability because of the difficulties of proving the taxpayer's motive. This argument certainly has some merit:
motive can be hard to prove and factfinders apparently hesitate to
find a tax-avoidance motive even in the face of compelling evidence.35 This is reason enough to avoid motive tests if alternatives
exist,36 for if only a taxpayer's admission will compel a finding of tax
motive, the denial of tax benefits on the basis of motive in effect
imposes a tax on candor. Suppose a doctor plans to incorporate his
practice in order to obtain the benefits of a qualified corporate pension plan. The Internal Revenue Service will not rule on transactions which "have as their principal purpose the reduction of Federal
taxes,"37 and without a ruling the taxpayer cannot be assured that
the transfer of his accounts receivable to the corporation will not be
a taxable event.38 What is t~e taxpayer to do? The accepted pracback, the rules the courts devise for the leaseback cases should parallel those of the grantor
trust sections.
35. q: C. LoWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 9596 (2d ed. 1974) (discussing the remarkable ease with which contemplation of death cases were
won by taxpayers under I.R.C. § 2035 before its 1977 revision).
36. The difficulty of showing tax motive proves very little, however, for it goes only to
technique, not to the fundamental question whether a tax-reduction motive should matter.
An advocate of tax-motive tests who recognizes their serious administrative problems might
favor rules not specifically employing motive tests but designed to detect those likely to have
been inspired by thoughts of tax-saving. In any event, proving motive may be less difficult
than is sometimes thought. Leading "anti-tax-avoidance" cases such as Gregory and Knetsch
v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), involved transactions th~t no sensible person would have
entered into but for tax savings.
37. Treas. Reg.§ 601.20l(e)(2), 1972-1 C.B. 701, requires a taxpayer requesting a ruling or
determination letter to submit a "complete statement of all relevant facts," including a "full
and precise statement of.the business reasons for the transaction." Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1
C.B. 719-20, provides that the Service will not issue rulings or determination letters concerning
"[t]he results of transactions which lack bona fide business purpose or have as their principal
purpose the reduction of Federal taxes." Rev. Proc. 73-10, 1973-1 C.B. 760, 762, a "convenient checklist questionnaire" for rulings under I.R.C. § 351, demands an explanation of"the
business reasons for the transaction."
38. The transfer of property "to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange
for stock or securities in such corporation" will not result in a recognizable gain or loss if
"immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control . . . of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351. The hypothetical doctor who plans to incorporate will want to ascertain
that the accounts receivable he transfers to the corporation are "property" under § 351. A
transfer of receivables could be considered an assignment of income by the doctor to the corporation. See generally Brown, Incorporating Transfers and Anticipatory Assignments, 38 U.
PITT. L. REv. 589 (1977). In that case, either the doctor might be taxed on the receivables the
corporation collects, or the receivables might be held not to be "property" under§ 351, and the
doctor would be forced to recognize any gain or loss on the transfer. One taxpayer's argument
that receivables are not "property'' under§ 351 was rejected in Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973), ajfd., 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
826 (1974). The problem of accounts receivable and the related problem of transfers of accounts payable are discussed in Kahn & Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Reve-
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tice, as I understand it, is to lie; the taxpayer solemnly asserts in his
ruling request that he is incorporating the practice for the "business
purpose" of obtaining the "efficiency" of corporate operation. The
lie in this process can fairly be called a legal fiction, for it deceives
nobody; and it should be unnecessary, for several cases say that a
corporation formed for tax reasons will be recognized if it actually
carries on business. 39 But this example merely shows that people
should not be asked to deny their tax motives where tax motive is
irrelevant. If good reasons exist to deny tax benefits to those who
want them badly, those reasons might support taxing such people
whenever they can be detected, even though others may escape. We
do not repeal laws against mugging just because most muggers cannot be caught.
Other arguments for the irrelevance of tax-avoidance purpose
proceed on the wholly erroneous notion that the tax consequences of
transactions can be determined "objectively," that is, from facts
other than those bearing on motive.40 Only a very crude tax system
could function, however, without taking into account the reasons behind actions. The importance of motive in the decision of even routine cases is commonly overlooked only because motives are usually
clear. Consider a taxpayer who buys a house for $50,000, lives in it
nue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L. REV. 461, 465-66, 476-77 (1975). The Service's
practice, at least as of 1970, was to issue a ruling allowing the tax-free transfer of receivables in
a § 351 transfer if the transferee corporation would sign a closing agreement requiring in part
that it recognize income on collecting the receivables. Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines
What Lies Aheadfar Professional Corporations, 32 J. TAX. 88, 90 (1970).
39. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943) ("So long as
(the reason for organizing the corporation] is the equivalent of business activity or isfollowed
by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable
entity" (dictum) (emphasis added)); National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d
Cir. 1944) ("to be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, a corporation must engage
in some industrial, co=ercial, or other activity besides avoiding taxation"); Ross Glove Co.
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 569, 588 (1973) ("If [the corporation] was organized for and engaged
in substantial business activity, it will be recognized for tax purposes . . . . [T]he fact that tax
motivations were involved in the formation of [the corporation] is not a basis for ignoring what
is otherwise a viable business entity" (citation omitted)); Sam Siegel, 45 T.C. 566, 676 (1966)
("If the corporation in fact was organized or utilized solely as a device for defeating taxes and
carried on no business of consequence, there is ample authority to justify ignoring the corporate form" (emphasis added)); Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc., 42 T.C. 601, 618 (1964); Aldon
Homes, Inc. 33 T.C. 582, 596-97 (1959).
40. E.g., Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 CoLUM. L. REV. 80, 82-83 (1938)
(with "one or two exceptions,'' tax questions tum "entirely upon objective facts"). See Sutherland, Taxpayers' Motive as a Basisfor Taxability, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 990 (1950) (though taxpayer intent often matters, it
should be irrelevant except in the few instances where Congress has made tax liability depend
on motive in order to correct particular abuses).
By "motive" and "purpose" (here used interchangeably) I refer to the reasons people act.
These words overlap to a considerable extent, though not completely, with "intent." The
great differences some find between "motive" and "purpose" are insubstantial for purposes of
this Article; using these words as synonyms will confuse no one.
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for a few years, and sells it in 1978 for $50,000. The taxpayer appears to have neither gained nor lost, and both his and his buyer's
motives seem unimportant. If, however, the buyer was the taxpayer's employer and similar houses were selling in 1978 for $30,000,
the need to inquire into the reasons for the $50,000 payment becomes apparent: the employee may intend to disguise $20,000 of
payment for services as part of the sale price of his house. If the
buyer had been a stranger, the transaction would have been taken at
face value, not because motive is irrelevant but because it would
have been clear. Many other examples exist. Suppose the "objective facts" of a transaction are that A wrote a check for $ 1000, payable to B, who then cashed the check. We cannot even guess at the
tax consequences of this transaction without knowing A's motive.
In some cases, the courts definitely should consider a showing of
tax-avoidance motive, not because tax-motivated transactions should
automatically fail, but because the tax motive sheds light on something else. Suppose a taxpayer offered a lawyer $5,000 to pursue a
tax refund claim and $2,000 to sue to enjoin a neighborhood nuisance. A factfinder confident that the taxpayer knew nothing of section 212(3), which allows a deduction for expenses incurred "in
connection with the . . . refund of any tax," would allow a deduction of $5,000. We would expect a different result, however, after a
showing that the taxpayer originally offered the lawyer $2,000 to
pursue the refund claim and $5,000 to enjoin the nuisance but reversed the offers after learning about the deductibility of legal fees.
Cases like this suggest that labelling tax-avoidance motive "neutral"
overstates the matter, but they do not even tend to show that taxmotivated transactions should fail ipso facto. Indeed, proof of a tax
reduction motive benefits the taxpayer in some cases. For example,
where it is unclear whether a bequest qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction, evidence that a decedent tried to fit the bequest within
the provision supports the argument in favor of granting the deduction.41
C.

The ''Explanation" That .Does Not Explain

The real case against tax-avoidance-purpose tests does not rest
upon the administrative hardships involved in establishing motive,
but upon the commonplace observation that most transactions are
taxed without regard to the presence or absence of a tax motive.42
41. See, e.g., Estate ofNeugass v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1977).
42. The textual statement must be qualified. As shown in note 47 i,!fra, administrative
impossibility is at least one reason the majority of transactions cannot be taxed according to
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High-income taxpayers forego opportunities to earn additional income for tax reasons. Taxpayers often sell depreciated assets when
the loss will most benefit their tax status. Other taxpayers live on
tax-exempt interest. All of them may openly admit their tax motivations without jeopardizing those transactions. This alone shows that
careful tax planning cannot by itself be the basic explanation for
cases denying some tax-motivated taxpayers the benefits they sought;
it fails to explain why a normally unimportant fact becomes basic in
a particular case.
The unimportance of tax motive in most cases does not by itself
prove that tax motive should never be important; tax-motive tests
could be appropriate in particular kinds of transactions even though
inappropriate generally. But I cannot think of any good examples,
and the best attempt I have found falls short. The Carter Commission Report, which at least recognizes the problem, tries to distinguish the cases where tax motive matters from those in which it does
not:
If a man gives up the right to income and to any control over the income or the source of income, even with the avowed purpose of reducing his tax liability, he should not be taxed on that income. However,
if he contrives matters in such a way that he continues to enjoy the
benefits of income, or if he continues to control the source or disposition of income, he should not be allowed to reduce his liability below
what a taxpayer in similar circumstances receiving the income would
normally expect to pay under the tax system.43

This passage distinguishes reasonably well between cases in
which one is taxed on income not received and cases in which one is
not. But it does not show that in cases where the taxpayer "continues to enjoy the benefits of income, or . . . the source of disposition
of income" a tax motive for retaining the continuing interest justifies
continued taxation, while some other motive does not. This point
can be clarified by considering the problem not as one of taxing people who have tried to avoid taxation but rather as one of not taxing
people who have not tried to avoid taxation.44 Control over the diswhat the taxpayer would have done "but for truces." The administrative-difficulty argument I
criticize here concedes the theoretical desirability of trucing true-avoiders heavily but argues that
problems of proof in individual cases make such a test impractical.
43. 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION: TAXATION OF INCOME (CANADA) 542-43 (1966).
44. The problem of Gregory, for example, is not really whether Mrs. Gregory should be
taxed as if she had received dividends; of course she should. The question is whether another
taxpayer who performs the same transaction for a different reason should not be truced. What
is the liability, for instance, of one who performs such a transaction to avoid a peculiar local
law that allows only indirect dividend distribution? Phrasing the problem this way may help
overcome fuzzy moralistic notions that all true reduction attempts are bad. To be sure, the
great majority of cases striking down artificial schemes differing in some trivial way from
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position of income is an excellent reason for taxing the person who
has that control and who has given up the right to receive the income
for tax reasons. This is true because control is a sensible basis for
choosing the person taxable on the income. Thus, good reason exists to tax one who has given up the right to receipt and kept the right
of control for a reason entirely unrelated to taxation, such as a desire
to benefit a relative combined with a distrust of that relative's competence to manage income-producing property.45
The inadequacy of any attempt to explain cases by references to
the taxpayer's tax-reduction motive manifests itself in a plainly ridiculous statement: "Tax reduction is not evil if you do not do it
evilly."46 This "rule" so obviously begs the question that no one,
doubtless including the court that made the quip, would seriously
argue that it explains anything. Yet those who insist that a tax motivation justifies denying a taxpayer some benefit assert this very
"rule" if they concede, as they must, that tax motive is often irrelevant.
plainly taxable transactions will involve tax-motivated taxpayers, for only such taxpayers will
have the incentive to arrange those schemes. Those who jump from this obvious point to the
conclusion that taxpayers lose because they are tax-motivated fall victim to the "post hoc ergo
propter hoc" fallacy.
See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978), where Justice Blackmun, in an opinion upholding a transaction motivated in significant part by tax considerations,
said that a transaction "not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached" should be taken at face value. This statement implies that transactions
shaped by "tax avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached" need not be treated
as the parties had hoped. This is sound enough as far as it goes, but what does the reference to
"tax avoidance features" add? It may be wise to disregard "meaningless labels," whatever the
reason they were attached. Neither Justice Blackmun nor, so far as I am aware, anyone else,
has ever justified disregarding tax-inspired "meaningless labels" while deferring to "meaningless labels" attached for nontax reasons. For the most part, Lyon Co. does not focus on the
parties' tax motives or lack thereof. Instead, the Court examined a leaseback transaction to
determine whether the taxpayer, who had title to the building in question, was in economic
reality the owner of the building. The Court seems at least to have asked the right question,
whatever one may think of its answer.
It may be worth noting at this point that not all tax questions can or should be resolved by
trying to determine the "substance" of the transaction, as opposed to its "form." There are
many cases (those involving elections are illustrative) in which formalities do and should control. See generally Schaffer, Another Guideline to the Rule ofForm in the Taxation of Corporate
Transactions, 56 TAXES 160 (1978), which notes a number of cases in which observation of
formalities does not subvert the purpose of the provision in question because no discernible
purpose can be found.
45. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930), the first "assignment of income" case.
The assignment in question had been made in 1901 and thus could not conceivably have been
tax-inspired.
46. Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1967). A more
elegant but similarly vacuol.!5 rule is provided in Income Tax Act, 1971, c. 63, § 246(l)(Can.),
which authorizes ignoring a transaction having a principal purpose of "improper" tax avoidance.
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D. Hard Cases
I have argued that one cannot justify the use of tax-motive tests
without distinguishing the cases in which those tests should be applied from the many cas·es in which they should not. In this section,
I argue that no such distinction can be found. Admittedly, I cannot
prove this conclusively without analyzing every possible tax problem
to show that the proper solution to each does not depend upon the
presence of a tax motive, a task I am not prepared to undertake. But
a consideration of the types of cases which commonly offer tax-motive explanations and of the usual ways of resolving those cases
strongly suggests, if it does not prove, that tax-motive tests are inconsistent with conventional ways of deciding hard cases.
Even in principle,47 one would use a tax-motive test only in close
cases, those in which one wonders whether "what was done . . . was
the thing which the statute intended."48 The transactions in Gregory
47. The idea that all taxpayer behavior could be subject to a "non-tax purpose" requirement is preposterous. Consider, for example, the inevitable failure of combatting estate tax
"avoidance" by levying on all estates the tax they would have incurred had the decedent not
acted to reduce taxes. Even if the decedent could tell the tale, he could not in any but the
simplest cases say how he would have left his property if there had been no estate taxes. Had
Mrs. Gregory's tax advisers been more prescient, she could have easily avoided the dividend
tax by doing nothing (assuming there were no accumulated-earnings tax or personal holdingcompany tax problems). Problems of proof alone show that any rule directed against taxmotivated activity must in practice aim only at tax-motivated activity closely resembling transactions taxed less favorably. Qnce the problem is limited in that way, one may legitimately
ask whether ignoring those differences is better justified by the resemblance to the heavily
taxed transaction or by the tax motive for whatever incidental differences exist.
It is intriguing,.though perhaps not very profitable, to speculate about the astonishing attractiveness to so many people of the idea that the schemes of Mrs. Gregory, Mr. Knetsch, and
others failed because of their tax motives. I suspect that some find simplicity in this explanation, which seems to make irrelevant difficult questions about the purposes of and assumptions
behind the statutes in question and the propriety of stretching the statutes beyond their "plain
meaning." But the appearance of simplicity is deceptive, unless one stops thinking as soon as
the particular case under consideration has been resolved. A rule that tax-inspired events will
be disregarded may seem to explain Gregory, but it does so by making incomprehensible the
much greater number of cases in which a tax motive is irrelevant. The "rule" against taxmotivated transactions accurately describes current law only if the rule is limited to "improper" avoidance, and that limitation raises all the difficulties sought to be resolved by the
apparently simple rule.
48. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The most common case of a transaction which is literally covered by a statute but which is not "the thing which the statute intended" occurs where the statute describes characteristics of a transaction to be taxed in a
certain way and where, while the actual transaction has all of those characteristics, it serves a
function different from that of transactions the statute was meant to cover. The reorganization provisions, for example, are meant to facilitate the rearrangement of corporate structures,
but the statute never mentions this; instead, it describes sets of events, the occurrence of which
are defined as "reorganizations" of one sort or another. From this divergence of statutory
purpose (facilitating or impeding conduct directed toward certain goals) from statutory technique (description of the features of transactions) grows the need for imaginative statutory
construction. The problem is probably caused by an assumption that statutes should define
and that definitions are detailed lists of the features of the things defined. q. C. DICKENS,
HARD TIMES 7 (1st ed. London 1854):
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v. Helvering, for example, seemed to be those that the reorganization
provisions describe. In effect, however, the shareholder received an
asset previously owned by her corporation-the taxpayer received a
dividend. The question was whether the events should be taxed
under the rules regarding dividends or under those regarding reorganizations. Had the transaction not resembled both a dividend and a
reorganization, the case would have been simple: a straightforward
distribution of the property as a dividend would have been taxed as
a dividend, 49 and an unequivocal reorganization would not have
been taxed. 50 Thus, resolving the case required classifying an ambiguous transaction having both dividend and spin-off features.
This kind of problem can only be resolved by deciding whether the
transaction, in its important aspects, was more like a dividend than
like a reorganization. Of course this resolution cannot be accomplished merely by comparing the number of dividend features with
the number of reorganization features. Faced with a case like
Gregory, a court must decide, for example, whether one or the other
classification will serve the purposes of the reorganization and dividend provisions; whether the language of the statute can support dividend or reorganization treatment or both; and whether a particular
result will serve administrative convenience while protecting those
who planned complex transactions in reliance on the apparent
meaning of the statutory language. This is not an easy process and
certainly cannot be reduced to a formula, particularly when some of
these considerations support one result and some the other. Since
an intent to reduce taxes is irrelevant51 in clear cases-those in which
"Bitzer," said Thomas Gradgrind. "Your definition of a horse."
,
"Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eyeteeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too.
Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth." Thus
(and much more) Bitzer.
"Now girl number twenty," said Mr. Gradgrind. "You know what a horse is."
I suspect that statutes drafted with explicit reference to the effects of transactions covered could
be sensibly interpreted without causing concern about 'Judicial lawmaking," and that such
statutes would need much less frequent legislative repair than statutes of the ordinary type.
But I cannot enlarge on this subject here.
49. Except for the extreme cases in which the taxpayer runs afoul of the accumulatedearnings tax or the personal holding-company tax, I know of no case in which the government
has even argued that a taxpayer in control of a corporation is not free to declare dividends at
whatever time best suits him. That assumes, of course, that a purported "dividend" is not in
substance something else, such as part of the purchase price of corporate stock, as in Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939
(1971).
50. Careful tax planning, which usually involves a ruling, is the routine practice of taxpayers who want to ascertain whether a transaction qualifies as a reorganization.
51. Every tax provision I know of aims at one of two goals: (1) obtaining a satisfactory
practical determination of net income, which is co=only thought to be an accurate measure
of "ability to pay," or (2) encouraging some activity. Denying benefits to people who try to
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the facts may be easily characterized-one cannot decide which
description a transaction more closely resembles by asking whether it
was entered into to reduce taxes. The question is whether a transaction more resembles X than Y; if the definition of neither X nor Y
includes terms of tax-avoidance purpose, how can the intermediate
case sensibly be classified by deciding whether it involves a taxavoidance purpose?
Many decisions commonly viewed as turning upon a tax-reduction motive have reached satisfactory results. If we wish to preserve
those results while rejecting the tax-motive explanations, we must
find alternative justifications. Since even the courts that claim not to
have been influenced by a strong tax motive sometimes fail to give
adequate alternative explanations, we must rationalize those results
in a new way. This process is somewhat artificial, since the rationales I offer will not be those given by the courts that decided the
cases. Tax-avoidance-motive explanations are so common that, for
brevity's sake, I shall discuss here only one recurring problem-"abuse" of the interest deduction-to illustrate how easily taxavoidance cases can be explained on other grounds.
Clearly, no broad rule denies an interest deduction to a taxpayer
who would not have incurred the interest in question but for the tax
benefits of the deduction. A taxpayer who finds that the homemortgage interest deduction makes going into debt to buy a house
more attractive than renting will surely not lose his interest deduction if he confesses his motive. Indeed, many view the interest deduction as a tax subsidy to encourage home ownership, which
assumes that people consider taxes in planning their lives. But the
courts have balked at allowing the interest deduction where it is
closely associated with the receipt of income that is either tax-free or
taxed more favorably than the income sheltered by the interest deduction. Of the dozens of such cases, Goldstein v. Commissioner 52
best illustrates this problem, since the transaction in that case was
carefully planned and carried out.
In 1958, Tillie Goldstein won $140,218.75 in the Irish Sweepstakes. To ease the tax burden of having so much income in a single
year, Mrs. Goldstein entered into a series of transactions to reduce
her 1958 income and increase future years' income, thus achieving a
keep their taices low furthers neither of these goals. Indeed, using the Internal Revenue Code
to encourage worthwhile activities depends upon tax-motivated behavior for whatever success
it achieves. None of the popular criteria for sound taxation, such as ability to pay, horizontal
and vertical equity, administrative convenience, or economic neutrality, has any discernible
connection with the use of taic-motivation tests.
52. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
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"do-it-yourself" income averaging. The transactions, somewhat
simplified, worked as follows: Mrs. Goldstein borrowed approximately $945,000 from two banks, prepaying $81,000 interest. With
the proceeds of the loans, she purchased discounted Treasury notes,
which paid a lower interest rate than the loans. The lenders retained the Treasury notes as security; indeed, Mrs. Goldstein never
had possession of either the loan proceeds or the Treasury notes.
Mrs. Goldstein deducted the prepaid interest in 1958 and reported
interest income and a capital gain on the sale of the notes in 1959,
1960, and 1961. The transaction was planned to produce a net loss
of $18,000 since the interest and capital gains received were about
$12,000 less than the interest paid, and the taxpayer paid $6,500 for
tax advice. Had the transactions been given their intended tax e~fect, Mrs. Goldstein would have come out ahead after taxes since the
interest and capital gain income she received in 1959, 1960, and 1961
would have been taxed at a lower rate than the top $81,396 of her
1958 income without the interest deduction. In sum, Mrs. Goldstein
hoped to forgo $81,396 of 1958 income, which would have been
taxed at high rates because of "bunching," for a smaller amount of
income taxed at lower rates because spread over several years.
The Commissioner's deficiency notice denied an interest deduction because " 'the transactions were devoid of profit motive' " and
were " 'entered in [sic] merely to reduce . . . federal income
taxes.' " 53 Holding for the Commissioner, the Tax Court said that
the transaction produced "the 'facade' of a loan transaction" rather
than a "genuine indebtedness.''54 In this the court erred, since the
loan transaction, looked at by itself, created at least as much indebtedness as loan transactions regularly given effect in real-estate tax
shelters. The Tax Court also noted that the transaction could not
have appreciably affected the taxpayer's beneficial interest in any
way except to reduce her tax. 55 This may have been an overstatement,56 though certainly the transaction was very unlikely to have
produced a nontax profit, but even conceding the point, it does not
by itself justify denying the interest deduction. In all interest transactions the taxpayer pays more than he gets back. The taxpayer
who pays $100,000 (purchase price plus interest on the mortgage) to
53. Kapel Goldstein, 44 T.C. 284, 295 (1965), qff'd, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967) (quoting the Commissioner's notice of deficiency).
54. 44 T.C. at 299.
55. 44 T.C. at 299.
56. The taxpayer argued on appeal that the Treasury notes might have increased in value
and have been sold at a profit exceeding the interest the taxpayer paid on the money borrowed
to buy the notes. 364 F.2d at 739.
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acquire a $50,000 house has surely engaged in a transaction that produces a "loss" in the sense that he pays out more than he gets back,
yet just as surely he can deduct the interest on the loan.
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's
description of the loan arrangements as "shams" that created no
"genuine indebtedness,"57 but it affirmed on the ground that the taxpayer's sole purpose was to obtain an interest deduction, not to derive any economic gain.58 That, of course, restates the taxavoidance-motive doctrine, avoiding direct conflict with the "right to
decrease one's taxes" principle only by phrasing the doctrine indirectly. In essence, the Second Circuit's theory seems to have been
that a transaction must have a "non-tax purpose" to be given its intended e.ffect. That theory was recently endorsed by the Tax Court
in a case involving the installment-sale provisions. 59 But requiring
that a transaction have a "non-tax purpose" to succeed simply insists
circuitously that a transaction with only a tax purpose will fail. The
Goldstein opinion, therefore, supports those who consider tax-avoidance purpose controlling.
Could a court that takes seriously the neutrality of tax-avoidance
purpose have reached the Goldstein result? The answer is "yes,"
and the cases suggest possible grounds for such a result. The
57. 364 F.2d at 737-38.
58. 364 F.2d at 740-42. One wonders how Mrs. Goldstein would have fared if she had
been able to convince the court that she had had a nontax reason for the transaction. What if
she had testified persuasively that, like Justice Holmes, she liked to pay taxes and that she
agreed to the scheme only to please her son, a creative C.P.A., who had dreamed up the transaction?
59. Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 576 (1976). This case involved a sale of appreciated
stock by a husband to his wife under a contract meeting the formal requirements of I.R.C. §
453. On the same day, the wife sold the stock for cash on the open market. Finding no "bona
fide purpose for entering into the . • . arrangement other than tax avoidance," and ruling that
the taxpayer "must establish as a positive fact that the transfer in question was undertaken
primarily for a bona fide purpose other than tax avoidance," the court refused to allow installment sale treatment. This cannot be an adequate explanation. One who makes an installment sale to a stranger who would have been willing to pay in full can surely elect installment
sale treatment, despite the obvious absence of a nontax purpose for making an installment sale.
There may well be good reason for distinguishing an "installment sale" like that in Wrenn
from an installment sale to an outsider, but the distinction cannot turn on the existence of a
"nontax purpose," which may be missing in either case. For one possible test, see Nye v.
United States, 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975):
[A] taxpayer may, ifhe chooses, reap the tax advantages of the installment sales provision
ifhe actually carries through an installment sale, even though this method was used at his
insistence and was designed for the purposes of minimizing his tax. On the other hand, a
taxpayer certainly may not receive the benefits of the installment sales provisions if,
through his machinations, he achieves in reality the same result as if he had immediately
collected the full sales price . . . . As we understand the test, in order to receive the
installment sale benefits the seller may not directly or indirectly have control over the
proceeds or possess the economic benefit therefrom.
407 F. Supp. at 1349 (quoting Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1971))
(citations omitted).
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Goldstein transaction viewed as a whole differs drastically from all of

the transactions one usually thinks of as involving interest payments.
It is the essence of an interest transaction that one pay more than one
receive, as did Mrs. Goldstein, but one usually pays a large sum over
a long period in exchange for a small amount in the short run. Mrs.
Goldstein did just the opposite: she paid a large sum in 1959 to receive a smaller one over the next three years. That fact alone justifies, if it does not require, treating the amounts she paid in 1959 as
something other than interest. Her payments were simply not for
the use of money.60 To be sure, by looking at the "borrowing" step
of her transaction alone, one might say that she had received the use
of money to buy the Treasury notes. But the purchase of the notes
was intimately tied to the borrowing, and the notes were not available to her except as security for the loan, so no reason exists to
examine the "borrowing" as if it were complete in itself. It was not
a separate transaction, and the courts should not treat it as such. 61
This is not the only possible explanation of Goldstein, and it may
not necessarily lead to the right result, for some theories of the function of the interest deduction would support Mrs. Goldstein's
claim.62 The example does show, however, that one who feels
60. See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), where Judge
Sneed denied an interest deduction without relying on the lack of a nontax motive for entering
the transaction in question. The taxpayer's deceased was a limited partner in a partnership
that bought a motel and other property and leased it back to the sellers. The transaction was
arranged so that the seller-lessee's lease payments equalled the partnership's principal and
interest payments. Thus, no cash would change hands for at least ten years, except for $75,000
"interest" prepaid by the partnership. The partnership's purchase obligation was nonrecourse. Since the purchase price was substantially more than the property's fair market value,
the partnership's payments did not yield an equity in the property. Conceding that interest on
nonrecourse debt is ordinarily deductible, the court nevertheless denied tlie interest deductions, saying, "Under these circumstances the purchaser had not secured 'the use or forbearance of money.' " 544 F.2d at 1049 (quoting Norton v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 608,610 (9th
Cir. 1973)). The Franklin situation is closely analogous to that of Goldstein: Mrs. Goldstein
received no important present interest in the property securing the debt; the partnership in
Franklin acquired no equity in the property purchased.
Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959), is one of the many cases denying an
interest deduction to a taxpayer involved in a "Livingstone transaction," an arrangement substantially similar to that in Goldstein except that the intended tax advantage resulted from the
payment of interest followed by the receipt of a smaller amount of capital gain, rather than
from delay of the receipL Most Livingstone transactions were not actually carried out as
represented, and were easily dismissed by the courts as "shams." Judge Friendly's opinion in
Lynch rejects the government's invitation to deny the interest deduction on the ground that the
transaction had no "purpose other than tax avoidance." 273 F.2d at 871. Looking at the
overall effect of the transaction, the court found that "no money was used or forbqme." 273
F.2d at 871-72.
61. Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959).
62. See, e.g., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 151-53 (rev. ed. 1976), pointing out
the theoretical and practical problems of matching debt with particular assets. Suppose Mrs.
Goldstein had been a wealthy taxpayer with a great deal of debt secured by some of her
property, or not secured at all. Had she simply bought the Treasury notes, paying cash, none
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Goldstein was right can reach that result without insisting upon striking down tax-motivated transactions.

What has been said thus far about case law applies equally to
most statutory provisions that deny tax benefits to people who enter
into transactions for tax reasons. Upon close examination, all such
provisions prove to be punitive 63 or to rest on considerations other
than tax motive. 64 The history of Congress's attempts to restrict the
traffic in net-operating-loss carryovers provides a nice example. The
predecessor of section 269 was passed in 1943 to prevent people from
buying corporations with net operating losses and using those losses
to offset income from a new venture. That section denied certain
tax benefits if "the principal purpose" for the acquisition of control
of a corporation, or for some acquisitions of corporate property, was
"evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax."
Why was it undesirable for a profitable corporation to buy the
stock of a loss corporation and use the latter's loss carryovers to reduce taxes? A plausible argument can be made that it is not undesirable at all. A market for loss carryovers could correct the
"overtaxation" of corporations with unused losses by allowing, in
effect, a refund to the corporation's owners by way of a tax reduction
for the purchaser that passes on to the former shareholders of the
loss corporation through the market.65 If a reason does exist to stop
of her interest deduction would have been disallowed, even though some of the interest she
paid could have been viewed as interest paid to purchase the Treasury notes, since she could
have used the money she paid for those notes to pay off some of her debts and thereby reduce
her interest payments. One can accurately describe Mrs. Goldstein as a taxpayer who lost her
case because she had little property, and thus had to secure the loan necessary to purchase the
Treasury notes with the notes themselves.
63. E.g., I.R.C. § 877 (nonresident aliens who gave up United States citizenship with a
principal purpose of avoiding taxes made potentially taxable).
64. See generally Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory Test in Tax Legislation, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 229 (1960), which concludes
that Congress's fondness for tax-avoidance purpose provisions stems from a lack of time to
analyze problems fully and from an inability to agree on the proper objectives of the legislation in question. The result is the passage of"language which in essence condemns the sinful
and upholds the virtuous." Id. at 254. The real issues are therefore left to the courts.
65. Tax Section Committee on Corporations, New York State Bar Assn., Report on Section
382 of the Internal Revenue Code as Amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 31 THE TAX
LAW. 283, 285-86 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Report on Section 382]; Asimow, Detriment and
Benefit ofNet Operating Losses: A Un!fying Theory, 24 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1968); Brock, Pas/,
Present and Future ofNet Operating Loss Carryovers in Corporate Acquisitions, 43 TAXES 586,
596-97 (1965). See also S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 201-02 (1976), arguing that
those who purchase stock or assets in order to acquire carryovers could get "large windfalls"
by taking advantage of the "weak bargaining position of the existing owners of a loss business
and acquire large carryovers for a few cents on the dollar." But the owners' bargaining position is weak only because of the difficulties of transferring carryovers. Carryovers would be
valuable assets if they could readily be sold. The Senate Report itself notes this phenomenon.
Id. at 203.
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the traffic in loss carryovers, it is that the shareholders of the loss
corporation suffer the detriment of the losses while the purchasers
enjoy the benefit of the loss carryovers. 66 Rather than responding
directly to this problem, however, Congress first denied the benefit of
the loss carryovers in the case of tax-motivated acquisitions. 67 Some
courts managed to apply section 269 so as to preserve loss carryovers, even in cases involving tax-motivated acquisitions, if the purchasers benefitting from the deductions were also the shareholders
who suffered the earlier losses,68 but the results were inevitably
haphazard since the statute was drafted without explicit reference to
this continuity of ownership problem. More careful legislation
gradually displaced section 269 with provisions focussing on the role
of the old shareholders in the ownership of the corporation benefitting from the carryovers. Sections 381 and 382, as passed in 1954,
expressly allowed loss carryovers to survive reorganizations within
limits that depended on ownership of the surviving corporation by
the shareholders of the loss corporation. Congress finally abandoned section 269 in 1976 (except for extreme cases) as a tool for
dealing with loss carryovers. When the revised section 382 takes
effect, trafficking in carryovers will be governed entirely by that section, which is concerned ~ostly with continuity of shareholder interest. According to the· committee reports, section 269 is to be used
against purchasers of carryovers only in the case of a "device or
scheme to circumvent the purpose of the carryover restrictions." 69
Thus, over thirty-three years the loss-carryover statutes evolved from
a general provision ostensibly aimed at tax-motivated acquisitions
into a set of rules designed to permit the survival of loss carryovers
when, and only when, the shareholders who suffered the losses will
enjoy the benefits of the carryovers. The current provisions might
have been written in 1941;70 that they were not is a symptom of the
66. The Senate intended to reflect this position by eliminating the continuity of business
rule in I.R.C. § 382(a). S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 202-03 (1976).
67. The traffic in loss carryovers was the principal reason for the passage of the predecessor
of§ 269. Rudick, Acquisitions To Avoid Income or Excess Prqfits Tax: Section 129 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 58 HARV. L. REV. 196, 200-06 (1944).
68. E.g., Zanesville Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964). The
carryover cases under§ 269 and the enactment ofl.R.C. §§ 381 & 382 are discussed in detail in
Asimow, supra note 65.
69. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1976). Whether § 269 is as dead as the
Committee seems to have intended is open to question. See Report on Section 382, supra note
65, at 288, noting that the language quoted in the text gives very little guidance as to whether
§ 269 can still apply in specific cases.
70. I do not mean to defend § 382, which even for a tax provision is arbitrary, mechanical,
and excessively complex. For a discussion of its problems, see Report on Section 382, supra
note 65.
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tendency to avoid grappling with complex problems by invoking illconsidered notions of tax avoidance.
E. BadLaw
As previously suggested, many of the cases striking down taxmotivated transactions because of that motive have reached sensible
results, but the reliance on the presence or absence of such a motive
has led inevitably to some plainly wrong decisions. If tax motive is
not by itself a legitimate reason for denying tax benefits, some taxpayers will be denied benefits they should receive. The gift and
leaseback cases illustrate this point.71 But more seriously, the widespread acceptance of the notion that tax-motivated transactions
should fail may encourage mechanical and literal application of the
statutory language, even though the results reached border on absurdity, when the taxpayer does not have a tax motive. The tendency to accept tax motivation as a justification for creative statutory
interpretation may well have created a climate of judicial opinion in
which a finding of tax-reduction purpose has become the only justification for giving the statute a non-literal reading.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Breech v. United States72 dramatically exemplifies a transaction taxed more lightly than it should
have been because the transaction in question was found to have
been motivated by nontax considerations. The taxpayers, Drummond, Breech and Haensli, were the shareholders of a corporation
(Valley-I) which sold its assets to a new corporation (Valley-2).
Drummond owned twenty per cent of Valley-2. San Jose, a corporation controlled by Breech and Haensli, owned the other eighty per
cent. Valley-I liquidated, distributing the sale proceeds to the taxpayers. The government contended that the transaction was a "D"
reorganization in which the cash distributed to Valley-l's shareholders was boot, taxable as dividends to the extent of Valley-l's earnings
and profits. This argument would surely have prevailed had the
Valley-I shareholders owned the Valley-2 stock directly. 73 The government argued that San Jose's ownership ofValley-2's stock constituted ownership by "any combination" of Valley-l's shareholders,
thus bringing the transaction within section 368(a)(l)(D); and that
the transaction was not in any event a liquidation, since Valley-l's
11. See text at note 26 supra.
72. 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971).
73. See, e.g., Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966); James Armour,
Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
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assets remained in corporate solution.74 But the court refused to
read the statutes in that way and accepted a finding of a "valid business purpose" for the sale and for the creation of Valley-2,75 though it
hinted that the government would have won but for the "business
purpose" behind the transaction. This holding ignores the distinction between liquidations and reorganizations: in a liquidation the
corporate assets are transferred to the shareholders or sold to strangers and the sale proceeds are transferred to the shareholders, while
in a reorganization the operating assets remain in corporate solution.76 In Breech, a decision supported only by the "business purpose" finding, literalism triumphs over common sense. Tax
motivation should be irrelevant to reorganization classification. If
Breech's transaction would have been taxed as a reorganization
when he had a tax motive, it should have been taxed as one when he
did not.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Consumer L!fe Insurance Co. 77 likewise illustrates what seems to be an
increasing tendency of the courts to refuse to inquire deeply into
problems of statutory interpretation except when faced with a
plainly tax-motivated event. The issue in Consumer L!fe was
whether the taxpayer was a "life insurance company" as defined by
section 80l(a). The resolution depended upon whether the taxpayer's "life insurance reserves" were more than half of its total
reserves. The taxpayer, which had made certain reinsurance arrangements with other insurance companies with regard to its nonlife insurance policies, argued successfully that the reserves for nonlife policies were attributable to the reinsurers, not the taxpayer, thus
making the taxpayer a life-insurance company even though the risk
of the non-life-insurance business remained upon the taxpayer. In
his dissent, Justice White pointed out that the Court's decision
"makes it possible for insurance companies doing almost no life insurance business to qualify for major tax advantages Congress meant
to give only to companies doing mostly life insurance business."78
74. For a government victory on the no-liquidation issue, see Telephone Answering Serv.
Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974) (three dissents).
75. The district court found a "genuine business purpose in the dissolution of the old corporation and in the creation of the new corporation." 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9584, at 88,028
(C.D. Cal. 1968), qffd., 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971). The Ninth Circuit's reference to a business purpose for "the challenged transactions," may suggest that a business purpose for each
detail of the transaction is unnecessary. 439 F.2d at 411.
76. See B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS ~ 14.54 (3d ed. 1971).
77. 430 U.S. 725 (1977).
78. 430 U.S. at 753 (White, J., dissenting opinion).
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This argument should have been persuasive, since neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history compelled the result
reached. The majority's only answer was that state regulation
would prevent "overreaching"79 and that the reinsurance agreements
served a business purpose.8° Consumer L!fe is an all-too-typical example of the willingness of many courts to ignore reality except
when presented with a plainly tax-inspired device.

II.

"PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE" AS A RATIONALE FOR
RULES OF TAXATION

A.

The Problem

Many rules of the tax law are commonly justified as necessary to
prevent tax avoidance. This need not mean merely that tax-motivated transactions should not be given their intended effect. Randolph Paul, for example, seems to concede that tax-avoidance
purpose has little place in determining the tax liability of unambiguous acts,81 but he has also said that "determined tax avoidance" must
be prevented. 82 The assignment of income doctrine and its statutory
variation, section 482, 83 are usually explained, when justified at all, 84
as needed to prevent tax avoidance, 85 though the case that created
the doctrine, Lucas v. Earl, 86 involved an assignment that was certainly not tax-motivated. The idea that Congress and the courts
should fashion rules to prevent tax avoidance sounds appealing, for
79. 430 U.S. at 749.
80. 430 U.S. at 736-39.
81. Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES 200, 231-32 (R. Paul ed. 1938).
82. Paul, Motive and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in id. 255, 302.
83. See text at note 89, iefra.
84. McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation <ifthe Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income
Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1582 (1977), find the doctrine to be "without support in any
normative model of the income tax." The only "normative model" discussed is the HaigSimons definition, which is not usually thought of as a guide to problems of choosing the
person taxable on income.
85. See, e.g., almost any book, article, court decision, or revenue ruling dealing with the
assignment of income problem. For a recent example, see United States v. Basye, 410 U.S.
441 (1973). The Court said that "liability may not be avoided through an anticipatory assignment of . . . income" and that an income earner "cannot avoid taxation by entering into a
contractual arrangement whereby that income is diverted to some other person or entity," 410
U.S. at 447, 449. The Court added that assignments of income "have frequently been held
ineffective as means of avoiding tax liability," and read Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), as
holding "that he who earns income may not avoid taxation through anticipatory arrangements
no matter how clever or subtle." 410 U.S. at 450.
86. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The assignment in Ear/was made by contract in 1901. A taxpayer with the ability to predict the sixteenth amendment and the progressive income tax
would surely have been able to predict the Lucas v. Earl holding as well.

1978]

Tax Avoidance

759

a rule permitting tax avoidance impresses those concerned with a
reasonably fair distribution of tax burdens as a bad one. But statements about the necessity of preventing tax avoidance prove upon
examination to be question-begging.
What can someone mean by saying that a rule is necessary to
prevent tax avoidance? Ifhe means merely that the rule is desirable
because it would defeat tax-motivated transactions, he is wrong for
the reasons given above. Just as clearly, however, he cannot mean
merely that the rule would tax people more heavily than they would
be taxed without it, for no general principle favors rules that impose
heavier tax burdens over rules that impose lighter burdens. "Tax
avoidance" in this context cannot mean simply "tax reduction." If it
means more than that, and if it does not describe tax-motivated conduct, it must mean the reduction of taxes in circumstances where
taxes should not be reduced. This in fact seems to be what people
mean by asserting that tax avoidance must be prevented. But once
clarified, the "doctrine" plainly fails as an explanation. Claiming
that people should not be able to reduce their taxes by doing certain
things merely raises the question why people who do those things
should not have their taxes reduced. When one argues, for example,
that the owner of a coupon bond should not be allowed to avoid
taxes by giving some of the coupons to a son before maturity, 87 one
says simply that the bond owner should be taxed as if he had kept
the coupons. The conclusion may be sound, as it surely is in this
case, but statements like these are inherently conclusory; they do not
explain why the transactions in question should not result in a reduction of tax.
In many cases a particular rule is so obviously necessary that explaining it as "needed to prevent tax avoidance" does no particular
harm. Suppose someone suggested that all noncash benefits received in exchange for the performance of services be exempt from
taxation. This rule would make unnecessary the difficulties of valuing noncash compensation and would prevent the occasional hardship of paying taxes at the time of a transaction that gives the
taxpayer nothing with which to pay that tax. But the objection
would surely be made that the proposal would encourage employees
to arrange with their employers for non-cash compensation, thus
"avoiding" the tax on their earnings. That objection is conclusory;
the real reason for taxing noncash compensation is that there is no
real difference between an employee who receives cash which he
87. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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uses to buy goods and an employee who receives goods directly. 88
The ''tax-avoidance" explanation in this case simply states a conclusion so obviously sound that few would press for an explanation.

B. An Example: The Assignment of Income .Doctrine
Conclusory statements of the necessity of preventing tax avoidance cease to be adequate where the answers to problems are not
obvious. The reason for a rule must be understood if we hope to
apply the rule sensibly in close cases. Since labelling the assignment
of income doctrine "needed to prevent tax avoidance" merely approves the doctrine indirectly, the label cannot help and may even
mislead a court deciding whether to apply the doctrine in an unclear
case. One recurring problem in this area is whether assignment of
income principles (or section 482, which for most purposes is the
same thing) 89 require taxing someone whose work has earned income, but who could not have received that income for some reason.
The classic assignment of income cases-Lucas v. Ear!, 90 Helvering v.
Horst, 91 and Commissioner v. Culbertson, 92 for example-involved
taxpayers who could have received the income themselves if they
had not given it away. Was this factor controlling? One is likely to
answer ''yes" if one thinks of the assignment of income doctrine as a
88. This rationale explains only the most obvious fringe benefit cases, such as Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), which held an employee taxable on amounts
paid by his employer directly to the government in satisfaction of the employee's tax liability.
The questions become more troublesome if the fringe benefit consists of an item the employee
would not or might not have purchased, such as travel passes for airline employees or free
tuition for college employees' children.
89. See, e.g., Phillipp Bros. Chems., Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57 {2d Cir. 1970)
(§ 482 "rests on" the policy of taxing income to its earner); Olla State Bank v. United States,
77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9455, at 87,149 (W.D. La. 1977) ("Section 482 only provides a method for
making the determination allowed by § 61 and is not a force of less power than § 61 "). Bui cf.
Ronan State Bank v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 27, 35 n.3 (1974) (distinguishing Commissioner v.
First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972), on the grounds that the taxpayer in Ronan had
actually received the illegal income in question and that the Commissioner was proceeding
under§ 61 rather than§ 482). In First Security and United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441
(1973), the Court discussed both§ 61 cases and§ 482 cases as if they were equally authoritative
guides to the questions before it. Section 482 may be broader than§ 61, in the sense that§ 482
can be used in some cases to allocate income to a taxpayer who would not be regarded as the
person taxable on that income under§ 61. Indeed, if this were not true, it would be hard to see
what function § 482 serves or why there is so much litigation over its applicability. Nonetheless, I am hard-pressed to think of any good examples, except, perhaps, the creation-of-income
cases recently summarized in Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199 (1977).
In any event, differences in scope between § 482 and § 61 have no bearing on the issue of
"illegal unreceived income" in Firs/ Security. Contra, Comment, Commissioner v. Firs/ Security Bank: Allocability Under Section 482 ofLegally Nonreceivab/e Income, 122 U. PA. L. REV,
184, 195-96 (1973).
90. 281 U.S. lll (1930).
91. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
92. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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device to prevent tax avoidance, for "avoidance" usually connotes
voluntary action. Someone who quits his job, for example, can be
thought of as "avoiding" taxes in a very weak and certainly nonpejorative sense, while someone who was fired would surely never be
described in that way. And the courts, probably because of their
infatuation with the notion that the assignment of income doctrine
has something to do with tax avoidance, have in fact distinguished
involuntary assignments from others. In Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 93 the taxpayers were banks which sold insurance policies to borrowers. The banks were prohibited by law from selling
insurance,94 and the premiums on the insurance in question were
received by an insurance company subsidiary of the holding company that owned the banks. The Supreme Court, finding that the
banks "could never have received a share of [the] premiums," 95 held
that none of the premium income could be allocated to the banks
under section 482. In United States v. Basye,96 however, where income earned by a medical partnership was paid by the recipient of
the services directly to a retirement trust for the benefit of the partnership's doctors, the Court held Lucas v. Earl controlling and taxed
the income to the partners. The Court thought First Security distinguishable since it had involved "a deflection of income imposed by
law, not an assignment arrived at by the consensual agreement of
two parties acting at arm's length as ... in the present case."97 This
distinction is inadequate, for the "deflection" involved in any assignment of income case is "imposed by law," typically the law of contracts or of gifts.98 The distinction is, however, suggested by phrases
like "preventing tax avoidance."
The validity of the distinction between Basye and First Security
ultimately depends on whether the policies underlying the assignment of income doctrine dictate it. Unfortuna~ely, the courts have
been content to defend the doctrine by conclusory references to tax
93. 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
94. Justice Marshall, dissenting in First Security, 405 U.S. at 412, believed that the selling
activities of the banks violated the statute in question, 12 U.S.C. § 92 (which is no longer part
of the United States Code, but which is incorporated in regulations issued by the Comptroller
of the Currency, 405 U.S. at 401 n.12), but the majority read the statute as barring only the
receipt of premiums from insurance sales. 405 U.S. at 402.
95. 405 U.S. at 401.
96. 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
97. 410 U.S. at 453 n.13.
98. Though entirely imaginary, this distinction may be firmly embedded in history. See
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (holding half of the salary earned by a husband in a
community property state taxable to his wife because she "owns" that half). Seaborn cannot
be corrected at this late date, but it surely should not be extended.
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avoidance and by invoking the notorious "fruit and tree" metaphor,
and have not identified the doctrine's policies. Yet the real reasons
for the doctrine-convenience and fairness-are so obvious that they
can be described with some confidence, despite the dearth of judicial
statements.
The choice between applying or not applying the assignment of
income doctrine is usually a choice between trucing the person who
earns income or controls income-producing property and taxing the
person who "benefits" from the income in question. Some common
definitions of income suggest the benefit approach, 99 but while that
approach has some intuitive appeal, "benefit" does not satisfactorily
identify the person to report income for tax purposes. Almost any
transfer of money can easily be viewed as benefitting any number of
people: the recipient of the money, his family, those who expect to
become his heirs, and his creditors, to name but a few. If we took
the benefit notion seriously we would have to engage in impossibly
complex tracing to identify taxpayers. Indeed, since the concept of
income is almost .meaningless without reference to the person whose
income is being determined, 100 the very idea of tracing income from
one person to another may be useless. One can trace money, of
course, but income is not money. 101 In most cases, however, it is
relatively simple to identify the person whose activities have enhanced wealth or who owns income-producing property. This extremely practical consideration alone justifies taxing income to its
earners. If not to them, to whom?
Even if it were possible to identify those who first receive the
money transferred in income-producing transactions as those who
benefit from income, an assignment of income doctrine would be a
99. See McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 84, at 1575, which relies on the Haig-Simons
definition of income to support the argument that "income should be attributed to the person
who uses or benefits from the income." As McIntyre and Oldman realize, a tax system based
on this theory would have no place for an assignment of income doctrine.
100. One can easily imagine money without an owner, at least for a time, as in the instance
of money buried in a jar by someone who has died. However, except perhaps for income from
property, one cannot even think of income without thinking as well of a person whose income
is described. The common confusion of income with money illustrates nicely the "category
mistake." See generally G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
101. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 51 (1938) (income is "merely an arithmetic
answer and exists only as the end result of appropriate calculations"). I do not mean to suggest that everyday references to the "receipt of income" are incorrect. In most cases a statement like "X has received income" so clearly means "X has received money in an incomeproducing transaction" that the shorter formation misleads no one. An improvement in style
may more than outweigh a slight cost in lack of verbal precision. But people who commonly
refer to "income" when they mean "money" (myself included) should take care not to let a
shorthand expression foreclose clear thinking about problems whose resolution requires an
appreciation of the differences between income and money.
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necessary adjunct to any tax system designed to tax equally those
who are similarly situated. Since one who earns money and then
gives it away or spends it in a nondeductible way is taxed, fairness
requires that those who give money away before it is earned also be
taxed. The difference between a taxpayer who gets money and then
gives it away and one who gives the money away shortly before receiving it is surely too trivial to justify important differences in taxation. Like most doctrines justified by the idea of equal treatment of
equals, 102 this one must yield to practical considerations, and the
contours of the assignment of income doctrine have largely been
shaped by the practical difficulties of identifying income earners who
have given up significant rights. The difference between cases like
Helvering v. Horst, 103 which tax the transferor of a carved-out income interest on the income when received, and rules that tax the
donee of property on the income it earns is more convenient than
principled. If A gives stock to B, we might say that the situation is
much the same as that in which A kept the stock and gave the dividends to B, and so tax the dividend income to the donor. But having started down this road, where should we stop? At some point B
clearly becomes the earner of the income. For example, when B has
sold the stock and invested the proceeds in something else, B's business acumen, not A's, has earned the income. 104 For this reason
some rather arbitrary lines must be drawn, particularly in cases involving income from property, and so the assignment of income doctrine has been limited to such cases as assignments of earned income,
of carved-out income interests in property retained, and of income
102. This explanation of the assignment of income doctrine appears most clearly in the
I.R.C. § 482 regulations, which compare related taxpayers dealing with co=only controlled
entities and taxpayers engaging in similar transactions with unrelated persons.
103. 3 II U.S. 112 (1940).
104. Even if B has not sold the stock we could properly regard the income as his, since his
decision not to sell it and invest in something else produced the income.
The facts of Greer v. United States, 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969), suggest a case in which a
mechanical application of that aspect of the assignment of income doctrine concerning carvedout income interests would lead to an arguably wrong result. The taxpayer in Greer assigned
a fractional "racing interest" in a horse to his children, retaining the rest of his share of the
racing interest and his entire share of the breeding interest (the right to breed the horse after its
racing life ended). Greer is complicated by the taxpayer's retention of a majority of his original share of the racing interest, but it seems to me that if the owner of a horse gives away all of
his racing interest, he should not be taxed on race winnings even if he retains the breeding
interest. Those winnings depend largely upon the horse's training and riding, and on the
choice of races, all of which are controlled by the owner of the racing interest. A racing
interest like that in Greer can be regarded as an interest "carved out" of complete ownership of
a horse, but it is not passive income like that in Horst. To carry this example to an extreme,
would anyone seriously argue that a bribe accepted by the donee of a carved-out racing interest to withdraw his horse from an important race would be income to the donor?
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"accrued" in a loose and nontechnical sense. 105
If one clearly understands the reasons for the assignment of income doctrine, First Security and Basye present no serious problems.
As the Court recognized, Basye is a clear case for applying the doctrine106 and is undoubtedly right; First Security is wrong. None of
the reasons for trucing income to the person who earns it and controls
its distribution has anything to do with whether an assignment was
voluntary. Indeed, it may even be misleading to say that the assignment of income cases invoke a "doctrine," for that implies that they
do something unusual. The doctrine provides no remarkable technique for taxing one person's income to another; it is part of the
process of defining income. That process necessarily involves defining the person whose income is under consideration. The assignment of income cases do not in fact involve assignments of income.
They involve assignments of money, which are not at all the same
thing, and they hold that an assignment of money, even before it is
received, does not assign the income connected with the receipt of
that money. So viewed, the assignment of income cases merely apply the familiar though often ignored principle that income is not
money, or even anything like money. 107 The First Security opinion
confuses "income" and "money." 108 The law of banking can surely
105. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Commissioner v. Phillips,
275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
106. Basye is clear at least if we view the problem as the Court and, apparently, the litigants did, as a question ofidentifying the person to whom the income was to be truced (i.e., the
partnership or the trust) rather than as a pure timing problem. A trucpayer who agrees in
advance to the postponement of income is not truced on the income when he could have received it, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, a rule which initially seems at odds with the
assignment of income doctrine. See Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAX L.
REv. 391 (1949) (arguing, in effect, that it is anomalous to refuse to give effect to an assignment
of income from one trucpayer to another while permitting an assignment from the trucpayer to
himself at a future date). In any event, the principal reason given in Rev. Rul. 60-31 for
allowing the trucpayer to delay income recognition by contract-the administrative problem of
deciding whether the payor would have paid the money earlier-does not arise in a case like
Basye, where the payor did pay someone. q. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16 (1978) (trucpayer with "individual option" to defer part of "basic or regular compensation" truced when
deferred payment could have been received).
107. See note 101 supra.
108. In Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962), a case cited with apparent approval by the
Supreme Court in First Security, a majority of the Tax Court held that the winner of a contest
who won the right to designate any person under the age of seventeen to receive a college
scholarship could not be truced on his winnings. The True Court, noting that the trucpayer
could not have designated himself as the recipient, seemed to think that a decision trucing
Teschner would have required trucing employees on income produced by their efforts but kept
by their employers. That is not persuasive, since an accurate analogy from Teschner would
require that at some time the trucpayer have the power to choose whether to do the work in
question and to designate the person to receive the money he earns, choices the employee does
not have. The exercise of a power to earn money to be paid to a relative (Teschner) or a sister
corporation (First Security) differs greatly from the case of an employee who works hard for a
small salary (except where the employer is, for example, the employee's own corporation, in
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require the assignment of the money. But whether something is income is a tax question, to be answered by the tax laws on the basis of
tax criteria. And nothing in the tax law is clearer than the rule that
legality under nontax law has nothing to do with taxability. 109
III.

CONCLUSION

My criticism of undue reliance on fuzzy notions of preventing tax
avoidance and indefensible distinctions between tax-motivated and
other behavior is not an argument that the tax laws should ignore the
well-known desire of taxpayers to reduce their taxes. Few taxes are
meant to be optional, and many tax rules have proved unsatisfactory
in practice because they were made with an incomplete appreciation
of the measures people would take in response. 110 I have argued
that the question whether particular conduct was tax-motivated
should be irrelevant to the decision whether that conduct should be
taxed in a certain way. This differs greatly from suggesting that the
likelihood of tax-motivated responses to announced principles of
taxation should be ignored when those principles are formulated.
An authoritative rule is likely to be too narrow if its author fails to
foresee taxpayer response. 111
Justice Holmes' opinion in Lucas v. Earl nicely illustrates the
need to anticipate taxpayer reaction to the law. Earl assigned half
his income to his wife. It might have been argued that his assignment should have failed because the wife was not a party to the contract of employment between Earl and his employer. The right to
which case IRC § 482 can be used to allocate an "arm's length" salary to the employee).
Whether Teschner survives Basye is doubtful.
109. See Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 418-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting opinion).
The taxpayer in Barbara M. Bailey, 52 T.C. 115, affd. per curiam, 420 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.
1969), was a bank employee who had embezzled funds by crediting her brother's account.
Although the taxpayer never received, or intended to receive, any of the money herself, the
court had no difficulty in holding that she, rather than her brother, was taxable on the income,
since she had "exercised complete dominion and control over the embezzled funds" by diverting them to her brother, 52 T.C. at 119.
110. For example, the accumulated earnings tax is in effect a tax on failure to retain competent counsel. On the Estate Tax, see generally Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives
on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977). A dramatic, if trivial,
failure was I.R.C. § 120, which excluded from gross income the amount of "statutory subsistence allowances" paid police officials. This section was repealed when police forces began
doing the obvious.
11 l. The phrase "preventing tax avoidance" cannot tell us whether we should have an
assignment of income doctrine, but once we decide we should,. we must consider tax avoidance
in shaping the doctrine so that it will apply to at least most of those who should, given the
reasons for having the doctrine, be subject to it. "Tax avoidance" considerations alert us to
future fact situations that may raise problems, but such considerations can never tell us how
those problems should be solved.
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his salary could have been said, therefore, to have vested in him at
least briefly before accruing to his wife. 112 The Court declined to
decide the case upon such "attenuated subtleties" and announced
the broader rule that salaries are taxed to the person who earns them.
Had the Court decided the case on the technical ground that Earl
alone held title to the earnings before passing it to his wife, welladvised taxpayers could easily have assigned their incomes by making the assignees parties to the contracts under which the incomes
were earned. The reason these more careful taxpayers should not
have succeeded where Earl failed is not that they were tax-motivated, but simply that the distinction between an assignment effected
by altering an employment contract and an assignment made by
adopting an additional contract is wholly formal and cannot reasonably support a difference in tax treatment. Holmes knew that taxpayers would enter into "anticipatory arrangements and contracts
... skillfully devised" 113 if the case were decided on technicalities.
That may well have been at least one reason the Earl opinion announced the sweeping rule now regarded as the cornerstone of our
tax system. 114
Many regard the language of statutes as more authoritative than
the language of judicial opinions, since the latter is routinely corrected retroactively when necessary. The failure to foresee tax-motivated responses is more troubling, therefore, in legislation than in
judge-made law. The abstruse complexities of corporate reorganizationlaw, for example, are largely attributable to Congress's continuing failure to grasp the elementary fact that many people find it in
their interest to take money out of ongoing corporate ventures by
arranging transactions so that they fall outside the definitions of reorganizations.115 By defining reorganizations in an apparently
mechanical and highly detailed way, Congress has provided those
who do not want reorganization treatment with an incentive to plan
corporate reshufflings so as to achieve nontax reorganization results
without the attendant tax consequences. Much judicial ingenuity
112. The court of appeals had decided for the taxpayer, distinguishing Blair v. Roth, 22
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 588 (1928), on the ground that the Roth contract
had provided for an assignment of funds after they were earned, while the Earl contract effected an instantaneous transfer. 30 F.2d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1929), revd., 281 U.S. 111 (1930),
113. 281 U.S. at 115.
114. The taxpayer in Basye argued essentially for the distinction Justice Holmes ridiculed
as an "attenuated subtlety" in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11 I, 114 (1930). But for the Firs/ Security
opinion, the Basye decision would so clearly have been a routine application of settled law that
it would not have merited discussion.
115. This is the familiar "liquidation-reincorporation" problem, one successful variation of
which is the transaction described in the Breech case. See text at notes 72-76 supra.
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has been needed to keep the reorganization rules from becoming entirely elective. To be sure, one can hardly expect Congress to anticipate and deal expressly with all possible taxpayer responses to its
reorganization rules. But had the threat been foreseen even in a
rough way, Congress might have drafted those statutes in broad and
general terms, leaving the courts to fill in the details in the light of
experience. 116 The most important practical advantage in thinking
about tax avoidance may be that someone who does so will understand the hopelessness of trying to deal in advance with complicated
problems by laying down mechanical rules. The world in which a
law will operate may not be the same as the world the lawmaker
imagined, for people change their behavior in response to the law.
Any sensible body oflaw must be in large part retroactive and therefore made by courts. The retroactive nature of judicial law-making,
often viewed as a fundamentally unjust necessity tolerated to reward
litigants for their efforts to clarify the law, 117 is really a strength, not a
weakness, of the judicial process. The judge knows better than the
legislator the facts to which his law will apply, and the most successful tax legislation has been the most general.
116. See generally Cary, Reflections on the American Law Institute Tax Project and the Internal Revenue Code: A Pleafor a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1960);
Brown, An Approach lo Suhchapter C, in 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1619 (submitted to
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959).
117. Cf. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 100 (1968):
Why, then, is the covert lawmaking implicit in the act of interpretation regarded as
being exempt from the taboo against retrospective laws? To answer this question we
have to consider, as with many problems in the design and operation of social institutions,
whether there exists any acceptable alternative. . . . Plainly, if the result of;· .. litigation were an interpretation that was operative prospectively and for future controversies
only, then the whole purpose of providing a means for securing an authoritative resolution of pending disputes would be thwarted.
Except for the cases (and there are very few of them in tax litigation) in which a litigant has
reasonably relied upon some settled rule, or in which the law is intended to direct people's
behavior, it seems to me to be odd to begin a discussion of lawmaking by assuming that reµ-oactive lawmaking is unfair. No principle of justice is more basic than "treating like cases
alike"; making a new rule prospective does precisely the opposite. It treats like cases differently because of the happenstance that one arose before the other. The intuitively appealing
(to me) way of approaching retroactivity is to ask not why judges are ordinarily allowed to
make law retroactively, but why legislatures are ordinarily not expected to make their laws
retroactive. For an answer to this, see Justice Harlan's opinion in James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Aside from problems of warning and specific intent, the policy of the prohibition
against ex post facto legislation would seem to rest on the apprehension that the legislature, in imposing penalties on past conduct, even though the conduct could properly have
been made criminal and even though the defendant who engaged in that conduct in the
past believed he was doing wrong (as for instance when the penalty is increased retroactively on an existing crime), may be acting with a purpose not to prevent dangerous conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or classes of
persons. That this policy is inapplicable to decisions of the courts seems obvious: their
opportunity for discrimination is more limited than the legislature's in that they can only
act in construing existing law in actual litigation.

